James A. ForeseCitigroup Inc.Chief Executive Officer388 Greenwich StreetSecurities & BankingNew York, NY 10013



August 27, 2012

David A. Stawick Secretary Commodity Futures Trading Commission Three Lafayette Centre 1155 21st Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20581

Re: <u>Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act,</u> RIN 3038-AD57 (the "Cross-Border Guidance"). ¹

Secretary Stawick:

Citigroup Inc. appreciates the opportunity to provide comments to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on its proposed Cross-Border Guidance regarding Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. This letter follows Citi's comments to the Commission's proposed Exemptive Order, which is attached to this letter as Exhibit A.²

Citi has long recognized and supported the need to reform the over-the-counter derivatives market. Accordingly, as noted in our Exemptive Order comments, Citi has devoted considerable resources to modifying its operations to comply with the anticipated final swap dealer regulations, with particular focus on compliance with the core elements of Title VII in the context of U.S. markets and U.S. clients.

As to the application of Title VII to activity outside the U.S., section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that Title VII shall not apply to activities outside the U.S. unless those activities have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, U.S. commerce, or to prevent evasion. The proposed Cross-Border Guidance, however, was unexpectedly broad in its application of Title VII to the overseas branches and non-U.S. affiliates of U.S.-based firms. Left unchanged, this could significantly harm the ability of U.S.-based firms to compete overseas, and could have a potentially destabilizing effect on markets and our clients. These unintended consequences are not necessary to the achievement of Title VII's objectives.

¹ 77 Fed. Reg. 41214 (July 12, 2012).

² Our comments to the Exemptive Order proposal are incorporated by reference for purposes of this letter regarding the proposed Cross-Border Guidance.

Consistent with our comments to the proposed Exemptive Order, we believe the Cross-Border Guidance can be circumscribed to protect the U.S. financial system from undue risk arising from overseas swaps activity and prevent evasion, while still:

- Not placing U.S.-based firms at a competitive disadvantage as compared with non-U.S.-based firms, and not placing firms that operate overseas via a traditional bank branching structure at a competitive disadvantage as compared with firms that operate overseas via broker-dealer subsidiaries; and
- Facilitating the implementation of Title VII requirements in an orderly manner by prioritizing resources on conforming U.S. swap activities to Title VII.

In particular, we urge the Commission to be cautious so that it does not unintentionally or unnecessarily make U.S. persons and U.S.-based firms highly disfavored counterparties in the global swaps markets. Doing so would simply cause those markets, related business activity and jobs to move offshore – a result that is contrary to the Commission's objectives, the U.S. public interest and the purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Accordingly, this letter includes several suggested modifications to the proposed Cross-Border Guidance intended to prioritize the focus of the Guidance on overseas activities most likely to pose direct and significant risk to the U.S. financial system. We believe this measured approach would facilitate the orderly implementation of Title VII and would not prejudice the Commission's ability to revisit these issues later if necessary.

1. Addressing the Objectives of Overseas Application of Title VII While Maintaining Competitive Parity for Non-U.S. Branches of U.S. Banks

As set out in our comments to the proposed Exemptive Order, non-U.S. clients have expressed reluctance to trade with overseas branches of U.S. banks due to the unexpectedly broad definition of "U.S. person." The Commission sought to address this issue in some, but not all, contexts.³

In particular, the proposed Cross-Border Guidance would allow non-U.S. counterparties to exclude transactions with overseas branches for purposes of assessing whether they must register as swap dealers. This reflected a recognition that U.S. entity-level rules together with substituted compliance for transaction-level rules achieve the objectives of Title VII while preserving the role of overseas branches as active participants in foreign markets.

Corporation, Citigroup, Inc., and JPMorgan Chase & Co., to David A. Stawick, Secretary, the Commission, dated August 13, 2012.

2

³ The proposed Cross-Border Guidance states that the overseas branch of a U.S. bank is simply an extension of the U.S. person. We note that this characterization of a U.S. bank and its overseas branches as the same legal entity oversimplifies the longstanding and nuanced existing body of law relating to this topic. Among other things, non-U.S. branches are licensed by local regulators, are subject to local regulatory requirements, and have operations in the local jurisdiction outside the U.S. <u>See</u> Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP on behalf of Bank of America

The proposed Cross-Border Guidance, however, requested comments on whether a non-U.S. person should exclude swaps with overseas branches of U.S. banks for purposes of major swap participant ("MSP") registration. We believe this exclusion would be appropriate, too. Unless MSP registration is addressed in addition to swap dealer registration, non-U.S. clients will still have a strong incentive to limit or even stop trading with U.S. banks that operate outside the U.S. via overseas branches.

In this area, the Commission's means of achieving its objectives of mitigating direct and significant systemic risk to the U.S. and preventing evasion can appropriately be balanced against anti-competitive impact to overseas branches of U.S. banks. The risk mitigation objectives of the MSP definition as it relates to transactions between overseas branches and non-U.S. counterparties are addressed by entity-level regulation of the U.S. bank as a whole, including capital requirements, risk management requirements, and Chief Compliance Officer responsibilities. Together with comprehensive swap data reporting, these provisions provide the Commission with adequate tools to assess the exposures of the U.S.-based swap dealer and illuminate evasive behavior.

Further, pursuant to existing U.S. banking law, including requirements enacted under the Dodd-Frank Act and related regulations, U.S. banks (including their non-U.S. branches) must carefully monitor and limit credit exposures to counterparties, including swap exposures. The Commission, together with the bank's prudential regulators, would have the authority to direct the institution to mitigate such exposures before they posed a significant risk to the U.S. bank, whether by reducing the exposures, collecting additional margin or holding additional capital. Moreover, other aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act are similarly focused on limiting risk to U.S. firms, and in turn the U.S. financial system, from swaps and other activity. These aspects include enhanced risk management/governance requirements, stress tests, single counterparty credit limits, capital surcharges, early remediation requirements, and heightened liquidity requirements. The Commission's view as to how best to achieve its statutory objectives should take into account other aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act that focus on similar systemic risk issues.

In addition, the Commission requested comments on whether U.S. transaction-level rules, rather than substituted compliance, should apply to swaps between the overseas branches of U.S. banks. The ability to trade with the overseas branches of other U.S. banks under local transaction requirements is crucial to the competitiveness of U.S. banks operating abroad. Not allowing overseas branches to transact with each other under substituted compliance for transaction rules would harm their ability to hedge risks locally, and in turn, their ability to be a major source of liquidity to U.S. multinational companies and local markets. Moreover, the application of U.S. transaction-level rules to those swaps is not necessary because the combination of entity-level requirements and substituted compliance would achieve risk mitigation and anti-evasion objectives without hindering the competitiveness of U.S. banks abroad.

In our view, the simplest way to address these issues is to define a non-U.S. branch of a U.S. bank as a "non-U.S. person." This would address swap dealer and MSP registration obligations for the overseas branch's non-U.S counterparties and make swaps with other overseas branches eligible for substituted compliance. Otherwise, U.S. banks would have strong

incentives to subsidiarize their operations in order to remain competitive, thus diverting jobs and resources abroad. An approach resulting in the fragmentation of the U.S. bank's capital and centralized U.S. resources, and ultimately requiring the shifting of capital and personnel overseas, would not provide better systemic risk protection than effective entity-level regulation of the U.S. bank.

In light of these considerations and our comments to the proposed Exemptive Order, we suggest that the Cross-Border Guidance:

- Define a non-U.S. branch of a U.S. swap dealer as a "non-U.S. person," provided that the non-U.S. branch remains subject to entity-level regulation in all cases and must obtain substituted compliance for transaction-level requirements when trading with other non-U.S. persons.
- 2. The Treatment of Guarantees and Inter-Affiliate Swaps Should Be Studied Further to Prevent Harm to U.S. Multinational Corporations and Preserve Capital and Jobs in the U.S.

The proposed Cross-Border Guidance would extend Title VII to apply broadly outside the U.S. to a U.S. firm's overseas subsidiary if it benefits from a guarantee of its swap-related obligations from its U.S. parent or engages in "back-to-back" swaps or other arrangements that transfer risk to a U.S. affiliate.

For a non-U.S. swap dealing subsidiary, the presence of a guarantee from its U.S. parent could mean the subsidiary must register as a swap dealer in the U.S. despite never trading with an unaffiliated U.S. person. The proposed Cross-Border Guidance also appears to suggest that a non-U.S. swap dealing subsidiary would need to register in the U.S. on the basis of back-to-back swaps with a U.S. affiliate.

We are very concerned about the impact of the proposed Cross-Border Guidance on U.S. multinational corporations. It would require an overseas subsidiary of a U.S. multinational corporation that benefits from a guarantee or regularly enters into swaps with U.S. affiliates to transact under U.S. transaction rules (or obtain a substituted compliance finding) when trading with an overseas branch of a U.S. swap dealer or a registered non-U.S. swap dealer. These multinational U.S. companies operate throughout the globe, and often rely on U.S.-based firms, such as Citi, to access local markets and to hedge their risks via locally executed swaps. Their ability to do so will be severely hindered if their local subsidiaries must trade under rules that are not consistent with local transaction standards when facing an overseas branch or a registered non-U.S. swap dealer.

We understand that the Commission made these proposals because of its concerns regarding the potential for guarantees and inter-affiliate trades to import risk to the U.S. In addressing these concerns, however, we believe that it is critical to distinguish between the use of guarantees and inter-affiliate swaps that are part of traditional risk management structures, on

the one hand, and the use of guarantees and inter-affiliate swaps to conduct business through a thinly capitalized or "shell" entity for evasive purposes.

For instance, ordinary course parent support commitments, general payment guarantees and capital maintenance commitments are often required to enter foreign banking markets. U.S. multinationals also guarantee obligations of their local subsidiaries so that their subsidiaries can effectively hedge risks in local markets. Inter-affiliate swaps, in turn, are often part of prudent risk management arrangements under which an overseas subsidiary can consolidate certain types of risk within the global organization where it can be managed most effectively by systems and personnel with the appropriate expertise. These arrangements often go in both directions, depending primarily on the type of risk involved (*e.g.*, U.S. dollar FX/interest rate risk would generally be managed in the U.S.; EU FX/interest rate risk might be managed in London). For U.S.-based firms especially, risk management expertise, personnel and operational resources are often concentrated in the U.S.

Applying Title VII registration or transaction-level rules on the basis of these traditional risk management structures would have several adverse consequences:

- Most of the key U.S.-based swap dealers would be required to register several dozen more affiliates entities that trade solely outside the U.S. and are already subject to local supervision and regulation.
- U.S. multinational corporations would be placed at a severe competitive
 disadvantage relative to foreign-based corporations if their subsidiaries either had
 to forgo parent support and inter-affiliate arrangements, or faced the need to
 comply with different transaction-level rules than those of the local market where
 the overseas operation resides.
- To remain competitive in overseas markets, U.S.-based firms may be forced to remove both parent support and inter-affiliate risk management arrangements from their overseas subsidiaries. This would have significant ramifications significant capital would need to be shifted to these non-U.S. subsidiaries in order to be rated by an independent rating agency, and significant additional resources and personnel would be moved permanently to these non-U.S. subsidiaries to appropriately manage swap risk on a standalone basis. As a result, the U.S. firm's capital and personnel would be diverted from the U.S. to foreign jurisdictions. As noted above, such an approach would fragment and harm the safety and soundness of U.S.-based firms, U.S. swap markets and the U.S. economy.

These are complicated issues. Before adopting an approach that would lead to serious adverse consequences, we believe it is critical that the Commission engage in further discussions with market participants, including U.S. multinational corporations, and continue to evaluate the progress of foreign regulatory reforms.

Accordingly, we recommend that:

- To prevent unnecessary disruptions in swap markets and to market participants, for the time being and pending further study by the Commission, Title VII should not apply to non-U.S. subsidiaries on the basis of guarantees or interaffiliate swaps where such subsidiaries are bona fide operating companies.
- 3. The Substituted Compliance Regime Should Be Streamlined and Transparent, and Should Evaluate Whether the Relevant Foreign Requirements, Taken as a Whole, Are Sufficient to Mitigate Direct and Significant Risks to the U.S.

The proposed Cross-Border Guidance would permit an overseas branch of a U.S. bank, as well as non-U.S. swap dealers, to comply with non-U.S. requirements on a "substituted" basis where the Commission determines that such requirements are comparable to U.S. regulations.

We are concerned that the Commission's proposal to evaluate foreign requirements on an "individual requirements" basis, rather than evaluating the foreign regime as a whole, could cut off U.S.-based firms from key markets. In particular, even where the foreign regime as a whole is generally comparable to Title VII, this approach could require an overseas branch to comply with some, but not all, U.S. transaction-level rules (*e.g.*, mandatory trading but not mandatory clearing). A piecemeal approach would not achieve its intended objectives; an overseas branch's non-U.S. clients will not trade with it under certain U.S. requirements if they could simply trade with a foreign swap dealer under the purely local market requirements to which they are accustomed.

We believe it would be more appropriate for the Commission to evaluate whether the relevant foreign requirements, taken as a whole, are sufficient to mitigate direct and significant risks to the U.S. In particular, we believe that the Commission should focus on comparability of foreign clearing and margin requirements and whether the Commission has access to the data necessary for it to monitor for systemic risk and evasion. Pre- and post-trade transparency requirements, on the other hand, which primarily serve local investor protection objectives, should not be the focus of a substituted compliance determination.

In addition, the Commission's proposal did not indicate whether there would be any public input into the process for making substituted compliance determinations. Given the broad policy and commercial considerations at stake, we believe that substituted compliance determinations should be subject to a public notice and comment process.

Exemptive Order. Because the Commission has access to data within this repository, such reporting would not pose a significant obstacle to the Commission's fulfillment of its monitoring objectives.

⁴ As described in our Exemptive Order comment letter, it would be appropriate to provide global U.S. banks more time to implement SDR reporting and swap data recordkeeping for their overseas branches. There should be recognition that, even after the Exemptive Order period expires, foreign law and market infrastructure realities will affect the ability to comply with the letter of these requirements. In particular, T+1 reporting to the global trade repository may need to be the standard for non-U.S. markets for some period of time following expiration of the

In summary, we suggest that:

• The process for substituted compliance determinations should be transparent, subject to notice and comment, and conducted in a holistic manner so as to prevent cutting off U.S.-based firms from key markets.

4. The "Emerging Market" Exception Should Be More Flexible to Account for the Realities of Dynamic Global Markets

Under the proposed Cross-Border Guidance, overseas branches of a U.S. bank would be eligible for an "emerging market" exception for swaps in countries where foreign regulations are not comparable, provided that certain conditions are met.

Citi supports adopting an exception along these lines, which, as proposed, would be based on a percentage of overall aggregate swap notional of the U.S. bank. A limit of 5 percent, however, does not take into account that substituted compliance may never be a viable option in many non-G-20 jurisdictions. Therefore, the proposed limit would significantly constrain the ability of U.S. banks to actively participate in those jurisdictions via overseas branches as these local economies develop. Moreover, swap activity conducted by overseas branches is closely related to other business relationships, and such relationships would be jeopardized if the required U.S. transaction-level terms were unacceptable to foreign counterparties. Accordingly, we agree with the comments of certain key industry groups on this topic (i.e., The Clearinghouse; SIFMA), including that a 15 percent limit of the overall aggregate swap notional of the U.S. bank – and certainly no less than 10 percent – would be more appropriate, allowing for growth in emerging markets at levels that are not material to the overall swap activity of the U.S. bank.

In addition, it is important that U.S. banks be permitted to allocate this exception flexibly in accordance with how they conduct their overseas businesses. The exception need not be limited to "emerging markets," as that term is difficult to define and markets change over time. We therefore suggest that the exception be available for any non-U.S. jurisdiction where substituted compliance is not available, and that a U.S. bank be permitted to allocate it by designating which overseas branches – and which swaps by those overseas branches – benefit from the exception.

We also believe that it is important to clarify the consequences of exceeding the limit. We suggest that, if a U.S. bank were to exceed the threshold, it should have a specified period to cure this excess by removing specific overseas branches or swaps from the class of swaps and overseas branches subject to the exception.

In summary, we suggest that the Commission modify the proposed emerging market exception as follows:

- A U.S. swap dealer should be permitted to designate specific branches in any non-U.S. jurisdiction and specified swaps entered into by those overseas branches as eligible for an exception from transaction-level rules up to an aggregate limit of 15 (and certainly no less than 10) percent of the swap dealer's overall notional swap activity, with any excess required to be cured within a specified period.
- 5. The Commission Should Ensure Competitive Parity for Swap Dealers Trading with Non-U.S. Clients from within the U.S.

Under the proposed U.S. person definition, a swap between the U.S. branches of two foreign swap dealers would not be subject to Title VII transaction-level rules because such branches are considered non-U.S. persons, even if the swap was solicited and executed in the U.S. through employees based in U.S. financial centers. Moreover, a U.S. branch of a foreign swap dealer would be free to transact directly with foreign clients in U.S. markets without having to comply with U.S. transaction-level requirements. By comparison, U.S. swap dealers operating in the U.S. would be subject to all Title VII entity-level and transaction-level requirements when transacting with <u>any</u> counterparty – thus providing a clear competitive advantage to foreign swap dealers and their U.S. branches, as foreign-based firms would be able to run their global swaps businesses from the U.S. without being subject to U.S. transaction-level rules, but U.S.-based firms would not.

Consistent with our comments to the proposed Exemptive Order, we suggest that:

• The Commission should modify the Cross-Border Guidance to ensure competitive parity between U.S. and non-U.S. swap dealers when transacting in the U.S., and when facing foreign clients from within the U.S.

* * *

We would be happy to discuss any of these issues in greater depth should you wish to do so.

Very truly yours,

/s/ James A. Forese

James A. Forese

Chief Executive Officer, Securities & Banking

cc:

Chairman Gary Gensler
Commissioner Jill E. Sommers
Commissioner Bart Chilton
Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia
Commissioner Mark Wetjen
Gary Barnett, Director of the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight
Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro
Robert W. Cook, Director of the Division of Trading and Markets
Securities and Exchange Commission

Mary John Miller, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Cyrus Amir-Mokri, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Timothy J. Bowler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Capital Markets *United States Department of the Treasury*

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

EXHIBIT A

Citigroup Comments to Exemptive Order

James A. ForeseCitigroup Inc.Chief Executive Officer388 Greenwich StreetSecurities & BankingNew York, NY 10013



August 13, 2012

David A. Stawick Secretary Commodity Futures Trading Commission Three Lafayette Centre 1155 21st Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20581

Re: Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, RIN 3083-AD85 (the "Exemptive Order"). 1

Secretary Stawick:

Citigroup Inc. appreciates the opportunity to provide comments to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on its proposed Exemptive Order to provide transitional relief from compliance with certain provisions under Title VII of Dodd-Frank. We appreciate the Commission's efforts to address these issues by proposing the relief contained in the proposed Exemptive Order. We expect to submit a separate comment letter on the Commission's proposed Cross-Border Guidance² in the next several weeks.

Since the beginning of the Commission's Title VII rulemaking process, Citi has dedicated significant resources toward implementing the extensive technological and systems enhancements necessary to comply with the anticipated final requirements. In this regard, pending cross-border guidance from the Commission, Citi focused on preparing to comply with the core elements of the Title VII regime for swap activities within the U.S. and from abroad when facing U.S. clients, including mandatory clearing, mandatory trading, regulatory and public reporting, and external business conduct requirements.

The proposed Cross-Border Guidance's application to non-U.S. swap activities, however, was unexpectedly broad. Because market participants' resources and focus have been prioritized on conforming swap activities with U.S. clients, there are specific areas with respect to overseas swaps with non-U.S. clients where we believe it would be appropriate for the Commission to grant additional time to conform. Moreover, non-U.S. clients are expressing significant concern about transacting with any U.S. or U.S.-affiliated counterparty due to fears and confusion related

¹ 77 Fed. Reg. 41110 (July 12, 2012).

² Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, RIN 3038-AD57, 77 Fed. Reg. 41214 (July 12, 2012).

to the Dodd-Frank Act generally and the Cross-Border Guidance specifically – for which the Exemptive Order can be crafted to alleviate in the near term.

Furthermore, the proposed Cross-Border Guidance raises complicated questions around competitive equality, the treatment of guarantees from U.S. affiliates and the application of Title VII requirements to "conduit" affiliates of U.S. persons. As the Commission carefully considers how to approach each of these issues in the final Guidance, the Exemptive Order should preserve a competitive balance among swap dealers and swap market participants.

Accordingly, we believe the Exemptive Order should be designed to:

- Not place U.S.-based firms at a competitive disadvantage as compared to non-U.S.-based firms, particularly while the Commission considers the complex issues raised in the proposed Cross-Border Guidance; and
- Facilitate the implementation of Title VII requirements in an orderly manner by prioritizing implementation resources on conforming U.S. swap activities to Title VII while providing a reasonable amount of additional time to address technical issues, particularly in the context of swaps conducted outside the U.S. with non-U.S. persons.

In addition, registration of non-U.S. entities solely as a result of guarantees or interaffiliate transactions may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and this issue requires more discussion with and analysis by the Commission. Any requirements in this regard should not be effective until a reasonable amount of time following finalization of the Cross-Border Guidance.

We suggest targeted modifications to the proposed Exemptive Order to achieve these objectives – including that requirements on activity with non-U.S. clients from overseas locations would commence a reasonable amount of time (i.e., 90 days) following finalization of the Cross-Border Guidance; alternatively, <u>Appendix A</u> to this letter sets out certain targeted modifications as to the timing of certain requirements. To the extent the Commission makes modifications to the Exemptive Order in addition to those suggested herein, we urge the Commission to grant relief only in a manner that will not give non-U.S.-based firms a competitive advantage in their ability to transact with U.S. or non-U.S. clients.

1. Non-U.S. Branches of U.S. Swap Dealers Should Be Treated As "Non-U.S. Persons"

The proposed Exemptive Order and proposed Cross-Border Guidance would define an overseas branch of a U.S. swap dealer to be a "U.S. person." This is a critical issue. Such branches have not historically been treated as U.S. persons under existing law. Moreover, because of the definition and its follow-on effects, non-U.S. clients have expressed reluctance to trade with any U.S. person due to concerns arising from the potential application of Title VII to them. If non-U.S. swap clients must treat a non-U.S. branch of a U.S. swap dealer as a U.S. person for any purpose, including for their major swap participant calculations or for Title VII

transaction-level requirements, they will have an overwhelming incentive to move their trading activity to foreign swap dealers.

In addition, there would be major challenges if overseas branches of two U.S. swap dealers transacting with each other in a local market were not included in the Exemptive Order. Because under the proposed Guidance overseas branches of U.S. swap dealers remain subject to U.S. transaction-level requirements when trading with other overseas branches of U.S. swap dealers, they will have difficulties hedging risks in local markets.³

Non-U.S. swap dealers, too, would face reduced liquidity when transacting in their own local markets because of the reduced ability of U.S. swap dealers to make markets abroad via their overseas branches, which are often key participants in such markets.

In the longer term, substituted compliance with comparable foreign regulations would be an appropriate way to balance these concerns with the Commission's systemic risk and antievasion objectives. Pending further deliberation by the Commission and input from market participants as to the proper approach in these situations, temporary relief during the term of the Exemptive Order is appropriate in order to prevent these adverse consequences to the overseas branches of U.S. swap dealers and non-U.S. swap markets. Accordingly, we suggest the Commission grant the following interim relief:

• During the term of the Exemptive Order, the non-U.S. branches of a U.S. swap dealer would not be defined as a "U.S. person." Even with this accommodation, such branches would still be subject to Title VII transaction-level rules for swaps with U.S. persons, and would still be subject to the same Title VII entity-level rules that apply to the overall U.S. swap dealer.⁴

2. Competitive Parity for Swap Dealers Trading with Non-U.S. Clients from within the U.S.

Under the proposed Exemptive Order and the proposed Cross-Border Guidance, the U.S. branch of a foreign swap dealer would still be defined as a non-U.S. person. As a result, the U.S. branch of a foreign swap dealer would not be subject to Title VII transaction-level requirements for swaps with non-U.S. persons, including other U.S. branches of foreign swap dealers. This is a clear competitive advantage for foreign swap dealers. These transactions are solicited and conducted by U.S.-based traders operating from a U.S. office of the foreign swap dealer. In contrast, U.S. swap dealers operating under the same circumstances would be required to comply

3

³ For instance, if an overseas branch made a loan to a U.S. company operating abroad that caused the overseas branch to incur a local currency or interest rate risk, the overseas branch would either need to limit its trading partners for its hedge in such market to non-U.S. swap dealers or, if it hedged itself through a swap with an overseas branch of another U.S. swap dealer, would need to comply with U.S. transaction-level requirements. This negates the Commission's intention to allow overseas branches to operate under local transaction rules subject to a substituted compliance finding.

⁴ We further discuss related suggestions regarding an interim definition of a U.S. person in <u>Appendix A</u>.

with Title VII transaction-level rules for all swaps entered into with all counterparties, U.S. and non-U.S. persons alike.

This result puts U.S.-based swap dealers at a significant competitive disadvantage. Accordingly, we suggest that:

• The Commission modify the Exemptive Order to assure competitive parity between U.S. and non-U.S. swap dealers when transacting with non-U.S. clients from within the U.S.

3. Phased Implementation of Technical Requirements

Individual firms and industry working groups have identified several operational, technological and documentation issues for which additional time is needed to assure orderly implementation. This is particularly the case for operations outside the U.S., since many non-U.S. markets are not as technologically sophisticated as the U.S., firms and clients use different systems and have different documentation conventions outside the U.S., and firms have focused on implementation within the U.S. pending publication of the cross-border guidance by the Commission. As stated above, one approach could be to provide a reasonable amount of time (i.e., 90 days) following finalization of the Cross-Border Guidance to apply requirements to activity with non-U.S. clients from overseas locations. Alternatively, we have attached as Appendix A to this letter a set of targeted modifications to the Exemptive Order designed to address these technical issues in ways that are consistent with the Commission's overall objectives of mitigating systemic risk and increasing transparency.

4. Term of the Exemptive Order

The proposed Exemptive Order would expire 12 months after it was published. We respectfully submit that this term would not provide enough time for firms to take the final Order into account in their implementation plans, nor to implement the final Cross-Border Guidance and associated Commission determinations on whether non-U.S. regulatory regimes are sufficiently comparable to serve as bases for substituted compliance. In this regard, we understand a corollary purpose of the Exemptive Order is to delay application of the final Cross-Border Guidance until other major jurisdictions have implemented, or finalized their plans for the implementation of, comparable derivatives reforms. Accordingly, the term of the Exemptive Order should be related to implementation of those reforms, and should commence on the date swap dealer registration is required for an initial term of 12 months (or alternatively 12 months from finalization of the Cross Border Guidance). We wholly agree that the Commission should revisit the term of the Exemptive Order in light of whether and when other major jurisdictions (including but not limited to Europe, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan and Australia) plan to implement comparable reforms.

* * *

We would be happy to discuss any of these issues in greater depth should you wish to do so.

Very truly yours,

/s/ James A. Forese

James A. Forese

Chief Executive Officer, Securities & Banking

cc:

Chairman Gary Gensler
Commissioner Jill E. Sommers
Commissioner Bart Chilton
Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia
Commissioner Mark Wetjen
Gary Barnett, Director of the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight
Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Chairperson Mary L. Schapiro Robert W. Cook, Director of the Division of Trading and Markets Securities and Exchange Commission

Mary John Miller, Under Secretary for Domestic Finance Cyrus Amir-Mokri, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Timothy J. Bowler, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Capital Markets *United States Department of the Treasury*

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

APPENDIX A

Phased Implementation of Technical Requirements

1. Interim Definition of U.S. Person

There are technical and operational challenges associated with implementing a new definition of "U.S. person", particularly with respect to funds and other collective investment vehicles, as firms do not have the requisite information or technological capability to identify or monitor the beneficial owners of such entities. Therefore, in addition to our proposal in Part 1 of this letter, we would not object to industry recommendations (i.e., the approaches suggested in the SIFMA and The Clearing House comment letters to the Exemptive Order, dated August 13, 2012) to address this issue through an interim definition applicable on a transitional basis. This approach would be consistent with the intended purpose of the Exemptive Order as it would aid an orderly transition to the Title VII regime; but any interim definition framework should ensure that a level competitive playing field is maintained among and between U.S. and non-U.S. firms while the Commission further considers this issue.

2. Year-End Systems Freezes and Similar Processes

Across the industry, firms are occupied with closing out year-end books and records during the months of December and January. For this reason, effecting changes to risk management and reporting systems would be very impractical during this particularly hectic time of year. Most swap dealers will need at least until January 31, 2013 to avoid complications arising from year-end systems change freezes, which begin in December. The proposed Exemptive Order currently delays compliance for U.S. swap dealers on entity-level requirements (except swap data recordkeeping, swap data repository ("SDR") reporting and large trader reporting) until January 1, 2013. As a short addition of time beyond the proposed deadline is reasonable and justified, we suggest:

• The compliance deadline for U.S. and non-U.S. swap dealers for entity-level requirements (except swap data recordkeeping, SDR reporting and large trader reporting) should be delayed until the later of February 1, 2013 or 90 days after the date swap dealer registration is required.⁵

3. Adequate Time to Implement Systems Changes for Reporting by Non-U.S. Operations

U.S. and non-U.S. swap dealers often have different systems for non-U.S. operations than their U.S. operations. As industry efforts have prioritized meeting the swap data recordkeeping, SDR reporting and large trader reporting requirements for swaps with U.S. clients, a reasonable amount of additional time is required to implement the systems and operational changes for reporting swaps by overseas branches and non-U.S. swap dealer affiliates of U.S. swap dealers

6

⁵ We note that there also are industry-wide suggestions for an alternative compliance schedule with respect to recordkeeping requirements for U.S. and non-U.S. swap dealers.

with non-U.S. clients, particularly with respect to swap activity in less technologically advanced markets and across multiple time zones.

Accordingly, subject to the interim Exemptive Order standards for swap data recordkeeping and SDR reporting suggested below, we recommend that:

• Compliance with swap data recordkeeping and SDR reporting for swaps with non-U.S. persons by (i) overseas branches of a U.S. swap dealer, and (ii) non-U.S. swap dealer affiliates of a U.S. swap dealer, would commence 90 days after SDR reporting requirements are effective.

4. Conflicts of Law Relating to Local Law Client Confidentiality Requirements

Additional time is also needed for the Commission and market participants to address concerns arising from client confidentiality requirements under the local law of certain non-U.S. jurisdictions. This is a complicated issue that requires consultation with local regulators. At least two dozen jurisdictions have been identified where local law prohibits the disclosure of client names to non-local regulators that do not currently have an information sharing treaty or agreement in place with the local regulator. One solution could be to mask client identities, consistent with the approach taken in the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group global trade repository. As this delicate issue requires more time for the Commission to consider and to develop possible alternative solutions, we suggest:

• During the term of the Exemptive Order, the overseas branch or non-U.S. swap dealer affiliate of a U.S. swap dealer should be permitted to mask client information from SDR reporting, provided that the failure to do so would violate non-U.S. legal requirements.

5. Conforming the Timing for Data Reporting Outside the U.S.

We understand that the Commission designed the timeframes for reporting the primary economic terms ("PET") data for a swap under Part 45 regulatory reporting rules to synchronize them with reporting transaction and pricing data for swaps under Part 43 real-time public reporting rules, so that a single data stream might be used to report transactional information following execution. However, this consideration does not apply to swaps by overseas branches and non-U.S. swap dealer affiliates of U.S. swap dealers with non-U.S. clients, as Part 43 would not apply to those swaps during the term of the Exemptive Order. Thereafter, non-U.S. swap dealer affiliates would also not be subject to Part 43 for those swaps, and overseas branches of U.S. swap dealers would be eligible for substituted compliance.

It is important to highlight that the data systems capabilities and market practices in many foreign jurisdictions with nascent derivatives markets operate at a significantly slower pace than in developed markets. The implementation of essentially real-time reporting requirements pursuant to Part 45 will consequently constitute a massive operational undertaking in these markets. More time is therefore needed for overseas branches and non-U.S. swap dealer

affiliates of U.S. swap dealers to develop and implement the infrastructure necessary to comply with timeframes for PET data reporting for transactions with non-U.S. persons.

Accordingly, during the term of the Exemptive Order, rather than mandating that these non-U.S. swap transactions be reported to an SDR under the timelines required by Part 45, a more feasible and effective approach would be for the Commission to access similar data from the existing Global Trade Repository ("GTR") created by the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group (of which the Commission is a member) to monitor systemic risk. Even though such non-U.S. trade data is typically reported to the GTR on a T+1 basis to accommodate the realities of foreign markets and clientele, access to such data will still effectively address the Commission's systemic risk and evasion concerns while providing the industry time to develop the necessary local operational and technology infrastructure within each of these jurisdictions. (We note that via the GTR, client confidentiality issues have been resolved to the satisfaction of various non-U.S. regulators.)

The following targeted modification would address the foregoing issues without materially interfering with the Commission's ability to monitor for systemic risk:

- During the term of the Exemptive Order, an overseas branch or non-U.S. swap dealer affiliate of a U.S. swap dealer should be permitted to report data for a swap with a non-U.S. person to the GTR on a T+1 basis.
- 6. Conforming the Categorization of Certain Other Entity-Level and Transaction-Level Requirements

The implementation of swap data recordkeeping and internal conflicts infrastructure poses unique challenges. Despite devoting considerable resources in this area, more time is required to bring non-U.S. operations into compliance with certain rules. This is particularly the case for those recordkeeping and internal conflicts requirements that apply to particular swaps or particular trading or clearing relationships – such requirements are generally transactional in nature, client protection oriented, and/or depend in part on local trading practices, and complying with them with respect to non-U.S. counterparties would require modifications to systems. To address these issues, we suggest that:

• During the term of the Exemptive Order, swap data recordkeeping and internal conflicts requirements that are transactional in nature, foreign client protection oriented, and/or depend on local trading practices, should be treated as transaction-level rules instead of entity-level rules for overseas branches of U.S. swap dealers, thus including such requirements in the Exemptive Order and subjecting them to substituted compliance review for overseas transactions with non-U.S. clients. 6

_

⁶ These requirements are: Section 23.605 (conflicts of interest related to clearing) of Commission regulations; Section 23.201(b)(4) (marketing and sales materials); Section 23.201(b)(3) (complaints); and Sections 23.201(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) (transaction and position records).

7. Reporting Backlogs

SDR reporting for historical swaps (i.e., swaps entered into before reporting obligations for newly executed swaps take effect) under Part 46 currently must begin on the same day as SDR reporting for newly executed swaps under Part 45. As a result, on the registration date, swap dealers will be required to report certain expired or terminated swaps as well as all existing credit and rate swaps, and all newly executed credit and rate swaps. Reporting for other types of swaps would follow 90 days later.

For both swap dealers and SDRs alike, the simultaneous implementation of reporting requirements for historical and new swaps will divert attention from making the preparations necessary to comply with SDR reporting for new swaps, and thus increases the likelihood of error. In particular, data for many historical swaps is not available in the format necessary for reporting. And many of the swaps subject to reporting requirements under Part 46 have expired or were terminated. Further, additional time for SDR reporting of historical swaps would not materially hinder the Commission's ability to assess systemic risk. Accordingly, we suggest that:

• Part 46 historical swap reporting for a particular swap should be delayed until 90 days after the reporting deadline for new swaps in the same asset class. (For the avoidance of doubt, this same 90 day timetable would apply to reporting of swaps between non-U.S. operations and non-U.S. clients, subject to the above suggested changes.)

8. Compliance Plan

We would like the Commission to confirm that the compliance plan required to be submitted 60 days after registration in connection with interim relief under the Exemptive Order is merely intended to identify a registrant's intended plan to apply for substituted compliance, and is not meant to contain an analysis of the substantive requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Further information regarding the substantive requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions should be required only as part of a comparability application to the Commission under the Cross-Border Guidance, which should not be due until 90 days after finalization of the Cross-Border Guidance.